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1. Mizrahi's and Dickinson's classification of philosophical argument types
In their empirical study "Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study"
(Mizrahi & Dickinson, 2020 – henceforward abbreviated as: M&D), Moti Mizrahi and
Michael Dickinson examine the change in philosophical types of argument over the last 150
years (1867-2017). They went through an extensive corpus of texts from JSTOR with
435,703 (M&D 1, 6, 12) philosophical publications to find argument indicators for three
types of arguments, namely deductive, "inductive" and abductive ("i.e., arguments in which
the conclusion is supposed to be the best explanation for some phenomenon" (M&D 3 –
allegedly (but in fact not) taken from: Govier, 2010, pp. 298-302)). More precisely, they used
36 argument indicator pairs for each of these three types of arguments, with one component
indicating an inferential relationship – e.g., "therefore", "hence" (nine in total) – and the other
indicating the type of argument – e.g., "necessarily", "probably", "best explain" (four per
argumentation type) –, so that indicator pairs such as "therefore necessarily", "therefore
certainly", "hence necessarily", "so definitely" were used to find deductive arguments,
whereas indicator pairs such as "therefore probably", "consequently likely" were used to
detect inductive arguments, and indicator pairs such as "therefore best explain" and "hence
make sense of" were used to determine abductive arguments (M&D 3-5). (There could be up
to ten other words between the two components. (M&D 5-6))
Mizrahi and Dickinson summarize their results with the following hypotheses:
H1: "Deductive arguments were the most common type of argument in philosophy
until the end of the twentieth century: [H1.1.] significantly more common than
abductive, [H1.2] but not inductive, arguments." (M&D 1, 2; similar: 8, 9, 10)
H2: "Then, around 2008 a shift in methodology occurred, and inductive arguments
took over as the most common type of argument." (M&D 1, 2, similar: 10)
H3: "In addition, abductive arguments are becoming increasingly more popular in
philosophy." (M&D 1, 2; similar 10)
H2r&3r: "Our results suggest that deductive arguments are giving way to not only
inductive arguments but also abductive arguments in philosophical practice." (M&D
1, 2, similar, 12)
In addition to the results of the statistical analysis, Mizrahi and Dickinson also provide
graphs (three of them, for up to three words, up to six and up to ten words distance between

the two indicator components) with the proportions of texts that, according to the indicators,
contained at least one deductive, one inductive, and one abductive argument, respectively, in
the total number of philosophical publications of one of the 150 years. These graphs show the
increase in all three types of argument over time – since about 1950, the increase in a
smoothed curve would probably be almost linear for all three types of argument – and they
also show that the deductive arguments have been overtaken by the inductive ones, as
claimed in H2 (M&D 7, 8, 9).1
2. A positive assessment and the course of the further discussion
The effort of the study, the number of texts examined and the degree of statistical elaboration
are impressive. The amount of work must have been enormous. And I acknowledge the
pioneering work of applying corpus research to philosophical argument types. I also
appreciate the great clarity in the presentation of the method used.
Before the detailed discussion, for clarity, it is best to present my overall assessment of
the hypotheses put forward by Mizrahi and Dickinson. I consider the following of their
hypotheses to be plausible:
H1 (deductive arguments are dominant until 2000),
H1.1 (deductive arguments are significantly more frequent than abductive ones),
H3 (since about 2008 there are significantly more abductive arguments),
H2r&3r (the relation of inductive and abductive to deductive arguments increases in
favour of inductive and abductive).
These hypotheses also coincide with my experiences with the increase in experimental
philosophy since about 2008, with the strengthening of methodological naturalism and also
with the discussion of the corresponding studies by authors who do not share these
approaches.
The following hypotheses of Mizrahi and Dickinson, on the other hand, are not
sufficiently supported by the study:
H1.2 (until 2000 deductive arguments were not significantly more frequent than
inductive ones),
H2 (from 2000 on, inductive arguments are more frequent than deductive ones).
The methods used by Mizrahi and Dickinson to prove these theses are, as I will show in
a moment, so uncertain, such weak indicators for the actual numerical relationships,
that the – even according to their results – small lead of inductive versus deductive in
the (according to the 10-word distance measurement) peak year 2009 of about 31.8%
inductive to 30.3% deductive (read from M&D 9, Figure 3) is by no means sufficient to
prove the predominance of inductive arguments over deductive ones since 2008 or even
the merely insignificant lead of deductive arguments over inductive ones until 2008.
The method of analysis used is, as I will show soon, so imprecise that Mizrahi's and
Dickinson's numerical result of inductive to deductive of 1/0.953 (=1/(30.3%/31.8%))
1

With this reading of the curves, however, I am not completely sure. The authors describe
the relations only as e.g., "Ratios of philosophy publications in the JSTOR corpus with
deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments" (M&D 7, 8, 9), without specifying what the
denominator of this fraction is. However, the most plausible interpretation for the
denominator is: the total number of philosophical publications in a given year contained in
the JSTOR database. And I don't really see any other reasonable interpretation.
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in the year 2009 is, instead, in my estimation, compatible with an actual numerical ratio
of 1/0.2 or conversely of 1/5.
In the next section I would like to substantiate this assessment of the very imprecise
indicator function of the method used by Mizrahi and Dickinson through a more detailed
analysis. Secondly, I will address some further weaknesses of the method used. However, I
would like to repeat here once again my recognition of this pioneering work. In this respect,
the following criticism is to be understood as a constructive indication for future studies. –
Section 4 draws a more general theoretical conclusion from this methodological critique on
the possibilities of computerized, automatic argument analysis, especially the classification of
argument types. – Finally, Section 5 discusses the philosophical significance of Mizrahi's and
Dickinson's analysis and of similar empirical studies in general: What does an empirical
philosophy of this kind offer?
3. A critical analysis of the method used by Mizrahi and Dickinson
In this section, I will discuss some aspects of the method used by Mizrahi and Dickinson.
Text selection, the basic set of analyzed texts:
Language: The authors summarize their results as follows: "Overall, the results of our
empirical study suggest that deductive arguments were the most common type of argument in
philosophy until the end of the twentieth century ..."(M&D 2). And on representativeness
they write: "Since our results were obtained from a survey of a large corpus of philosophical
texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 435,703), we can be quite confident that they are
representative of philosophical practice" (M&D 11). Now, as indicators for the different
types of arguments, only English expressions were used, such as "therefore necessarily",
"consequently improbable". Does this mean that arguments in non-English languages are not
philosophical arguments per se? (The fact that the non-English languages are
underrepresented in JSTOR is problematic enough. That they are completely ignored by
Mizrahi and Dickinson, however, is dramatic.) This – presumably unintentional and simply
naive – Anglo-Saxon chauvinism may also lead to serious distortions of the quantitative
results, if – and there is some evidence for this – the "inductive wave" (see below) in nonEnglish philosophical publications, for example, is by far not as large as in English-speaking
ones.
Criteria for a philosophical text: By what criteria was it determined what a philosophical text
is? Unfortunately, the authors do not tell us. Is the criterion that the text was published in a
journal to be considered philosophical? What then applies to journals such as 'American
Journal of Theology and Philosophy', 'Philosophy and Rhetoric'? The articles published there
are certainly not all philosophical. And do not, conversely, philosophical articles also appear
in the general journals of the surrounding disciplines or interdisciplinary journals such as
'Philosophy and Economics' or 'Philosophical Psychology'? What about monographs and
anthologies? The texts cover a period of 150 years, the oldest of which date from 1867. Can
we be sure that the texts in "philosophical" journals were always philosophical? In the past,
philosophical texts also included texts that we would now quite clearly regard as educational
or psychological. Different criteria for the philosophical character of a text naturally change
the results considerably. Presumably, the more liberal the admission, the greater the
proportion of "inductive" arguments.
Different types of arguments: The authors distinguish between deductive, inductive and
abductive arguments. What deductive arguments are is probably fairly clear in the
argumentation theory community. The other two categories are more problematic.
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Inductive arguments: What "inductive arguments" are supposed to be is not defined by the
authors. But it is clear from the context that for them inductive arguments are those
arguments in which probabilistic words such as "probably", "likely", "improbable",
"plausible" occur in the thesis or in the description of the inferential relationship (M&D 3).
This criterion is rather un-theoretical and leads to a completely heterogeneous set of
arguments. 1. Apart from probabilistic arguments, many of the actual probabilistic indicators
also occur in all non-probabilistic arguments, especially to express uncertainty, in particular
in practical arguments, but even in deductive ones: "Probably the thesis follows from it", if
the inferential relationship is complicated and has not been formally verified. One can also
express a thesis probabilistically out of laziness, if one does not take the trouble to give more
rigorous proof. 2. The set of really probabilistic arguments that are intended to establish
degrees of probability is very heterogeneous. This might have been worth some
differentiation. For example, according to an epistemological reconstruction, even the genesis
of knowledge arguments such as arguments from expert opinion, arguments from position to
know, source references, belong to the probabilistic arguments, whereas usually they are
understood as a separate group (Lumer, 2011a, pp. 22-23). 3. From probabilism it does not
follow that these are empirical arguments in the usual sense – as the authors seem to assume,
however – namely that from individual observations a general connection is inferred or from
there back to an individual case. Example: "We have not seen a real proof of p. Therefore,
probably we cannot say that p." e.g., does not seem to fit in with either of the two inference
forms.
Abductive arguments: 1. Arguments that provide the best explanation can be very different in
structure, ranging from simple backward conclusions: "Where smoke rises, there is probably
a fire. There is smoke rising. Underneath there is probably a fire" to fully developed
interpretive arguments with alternative hypothetical explanations of known facts and the
Bayesian determination of the probability of these explanations; in the latter case the "best
explanation" is interpreted as the most probable. The former are indicative arguments with
simple statistical inferences with a special content. The latter are interpretive arguments with
a very high complexity. (Cf. Lumer, 1990, pp. 221-246) This structural difference is
neglected by Mizrahi's and Dickinson's classification. But perhaps this is not a serious flaw,
and this differentiation may also be omitted. 2. But in any case, arguments to the best
explanation, correctly analysed, also belong to the probabilistic arguments, i.e. according to
the terminology of Mizrahi and Dickinson to the inductive arguments. Accordingly, all their
indicators of "inductive" argumentations can also indicate abductive arguments. However, if
abductive arguments are treated as a separate type of argument, then other prominent
subtypes of probabilistic arguments would also have to be treated as separate types of
arguments.
Elementary and molecular arguments: 1. Molecular or complex arguments are composed of
several elementary arguments to form a tree structure, whereby the arguments at the ends of
the branches of the tree establish the premises for the arguments further towards the trunk.
Such complex arguments often involve elementary arguments of different types; and yet
molecular argumentation can often be assigned to a particular type of argument (see Lumer,
2011a, pp. 10, 20-24). According to the method of Mizrahi and Dickinson, all the elements of
a molecular argumentation would be included as separate arguments. However, this
contradicts the usual approach, according to which complex arguments are regarded as one
argument. 2. The method of Mizrahi and Dickinson can then also lead to a distortion of the
numerical relations between the types of arguments, for example if one type of argument is
used more often than others in a subordinate function. This is somewhat the case with
practical arguments that often use probabilistic arguments to prove their consequential
assumptions.
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Missing argument types: The triple list of deductive, inductive, abductive arguments
does not contain a number of other arguments, which are, however, philosophically relevant:
–practical arguments (for value judgements with the listing of advantages and
disadvantages of the value object);
–genuine statistical arguments (with information on correlations and levels of
significance; these arguments usually do not speak of "probability");
–intuitionistic arguments (which use certain intuitions as the essential premise);
–genesis of knowledge arguments (which refer to the verification of the thesis by
another person: argument from expert opinion, reference to historical sources,
arguments from testimony).
While practical arguments are definitely a separate type of argument alongside deductive and
probabilistic ones, descriptive statistical and intuitionistic arguments are mostly deductive
and the genesis of knowledge arguments are probabilistic (Lumer, 2011a). But this is highly
controversial. And it should have been addressed.
Empirical determination of the argument types – errors in the recognition of argument
types: In the empirical identification of argument types within a selected text corpus,
basically two types of errors can occur: 1. false positive, misclassifications, in which a piece
of text is classified as an argument of type T although the piece of text is not an argument of
type T, and 2. false negatives, it is not recognized that an argument of type T is present. A
special case are false positives, which are also false negatives, i.e. if an argument is classified
as being of a different type than it is.
False positives: 1. Some of the argument indicators used by Mizrahi and Dickinson may,
despite their first appearance, indicate something different from the assumed type of
argument: e.g., "accordingly ..." may indicate the execution of a plan or the compliance with
criteria: "Accordingly, I definitely took her at her word"; "Accordingly, necessarily we first
had to check whether...". 2. The indicators may be taken from a literal quotation or a
paraphrased text, from which the arguer however disassociates himself: "The author infers
that certainly p. But ...". 3. The indicator may be qualified or even negated by the context:
"From this we cannot infer that necessarily p holds"; "it seems therefore necessarily that p;
however ...".
False negatives: 1. Most arguments use only one indicator, not two. The inference indicator
can be missing and only the strength indicator can be used: "p1, ..., pn. Necessarily t." The
converse case is much more frequent, however, namely that the inference indicator is present,
but a strength indicator or abduction indicator is not added. 2. Instead of the mentioned
indicators, wording variants of them are used: "infer / proves with necessity" (instead of
"infer / proves necessarily"); "we have proved definitely" (instead of "proves definitely"). 3.
Completely different indicators are used than those that appear in the Mizrahi and Dickinson
list, also including those that the authors themselves have mentioned before, especially
inferential indicators: "because of p q (holds)"; "because p we can be sure that q", "this makes
me think", "with this I have shown that", "this makes it probable", "this implies", "since
(then)", "then also holds", "presumably then", "this is strong / weak evidence for", "the most
probable explanation for this is" etc. 4. The usual inference indicators are not used, but
completely free descriptions like: "my thesis is ...; and the reasons for it are", "why should it
be the case that? Well, consider". 5. No explicit argument indicators are used at all – which in
English, unlike other Western European languages, occurs relatively frequently –, but the
argumentative connection results only from the content. 6. The distance between inference
indicator and qualifier is even greater than 10 words.
Much more false negatives than false positives: Mizrahi and Dickinson have chosen extra
strong indicators to exclude false positives ("In order to make sure that our indicators for
argument types [...] actually indicate arguments in the corpus, we anchored them to argument
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indicators, such as 'therefore' and 'hence'" (M&D 4)). And indeed, the resulting combinations
are already relatively safe signs for the respective assumed arguments – even if, as analyzed
above, false positives remain. The price for this relatively high degree of certainty in the
exclusion of false positives by an indicator overkill is, conversely, the high number of false
negatives: If the hurdles for "recognition" as an argument of a certain type are set so high,
then they are not met by very many arguments that definitely belong to this type. Many
arguments do not use this double indicator, but only a single one (and, in addition, others than
those specified or none at all, see below). I estimate that with the argument indicators used by
Mizrahi and Dickinson at most 10% of the actual arguments of the type in question are
covered.2
Due to the high proportion of false negatives there is very great uncertainty, strong
distortions of the relations are possible: Mizrahi and Dickinson may have chosen the strong
indicators with the hidden idea that the numerical relations among the captured arguments of
the three types are the same as among all arguments of these types in their text corpus. But
with the high number of false negatives, a relatively small difference in the rates of false
negatives for the three argument types makes a great deal of difference to the overall ratio.
For example, if the proportion of false negatives in the deductive arguments is 90%, but 95%
in the "inductive" arguments, then the measured ratio can change from 1:1 to 1:2.
No check of the reliability of the test instrument: What is most surprising in this situation is
that the authors did not check the reliability of their test instrument (i.e. the automated search
by computer for the given argument indicators) at all and did not calibrate this instrument.
Such a reliability check can be carried out relatively easily by having the test instrument
examine some texts, from which all the arguments contained in them have been identified
and classified by human reading and analysis, and comparing the two results. – I started such
a test with an analysis of Derek Parfit's article: "Equality and Priority" (1997). The result
confirms the criticism that has been made so far from a theoretical standpoint: The search for
the 108 indicators of Mizrahi and Dickinson had exactly one result: on page 208 the indicator
words "necessarily ... therefore" were found with a sufficiently small distance. Unfortunately,
this was a false positive: Both words do not indicate an argument with Parfit, but rather an
analytical implication of a moral criterion (which he does not accept); in other words: Parfit
here makes an assertion about an implication relationship, but he does not argue.
(Incidentally, the two indicators are in two successive sentences and refer to different
implication relations ("necessarily" to the implication: injustice / badness → wrong-doing;
"therefore" to the implication: unjust → bad); the double indicator condition is therefore only
fulfilled by chance.) – Parfit's text is not particularly argumentative but explanatory: Parfit
describes a new, prioritarian criterion for distributive justice and differentiates it from
egalitarian ones. Nevertheless, the text contains a whole range of arguments which cannot be
found with the method of Mizrahi and Dickinson, i.e., false negatives: 2 practical arguments
(Parfit, 1997, pp. 210-211) (in them objections are introduced with the words "objections").
In addition, the text contains various deductive arguments (e.g., p. 212 with the argument
indicator "since" or p. 215-216 with the argument indicator "then").
The empirical determination of argumentation types – methodological distortion of
quantities: What the authors count with their method is not the number of, respectively,
2

This estimate of mine may seem prima facie to be completely wrong if one considers e.g.
that 2009, the year with the most hits, the "inductive" arguments were 31.8%, so that there
would be room for a tripling (95.4%) but not for a tenfold increase. But this appearance is
deceptive: the number of hits does not indicate the proportion of arguments, but the
proportion of texts with this type of argument, whether this text contains one or 100
arguments of this type.
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deductive, inductive and abductive arguments in the philosophical publications of a given
year, but with regard to the publications of this year: the sums of all the numbers of the types
of, respectively, deductive, inductive and abductive argument indicators occurring in the
individual publications (M&D 6).3 Thus, behind one unit of the count there can be one
argument with a certain indicator, but also 20 or more. In order to determine the weight of
e.g., deductive arguments, however, the number of arguments should actually be considered.
Of course both quantities might correlate optimally, but this would be coincidence.
Distortions also of the relations of the frequencies of the individual argument types can result
from the following: 1. Authors use a very limited number of indicators for a certain argument
type, while they vary the indicator very much for another of Mizrahi's and Dickinson's
argument types. 2. Behind the individual indicator types there are very different numbers of
indicator occurrences and thus of arguments. (This leads in particular to distortions if these
different frequencies are not compensated by an increase in the richness of variation of the
indicator expressions. For example, the author uses three indicator types each for deductive
arguments and for "inductive" arguments; but in the text there are 20 deductive and five
"inductive" arguments.)
A methodological blemish is that the article does not contain certain information that
would have been helpful for the classification of the result: How many texts contained
arguments at all and how many arguments of what kind? Which indicators of argumentation
occurred how often?
4. Limits of automatic argumentation analysis
Mizrahi and Dickinson have used a relatively simple criterion for the automatic identification
of arguments and for the analysis of the type of argument, whose considerable
methodological weaknesses and quantitative inaccuracies have been sufficiently explained in
the previous section. Can the weaknesses described be eliminated with better automated
procedures? Perhaps sometime, but there is certainly a long way to go until then.
The problems begin with the fact that up to now there is not even an approximate
agreement on the existing types of argument, even on a theoretical level. Of course, this does
not exclude the possibility of trying to use automatic procedures in cases where there is broad
agreement. But the problems mentioned above exist to a not inconsiderable extent for any
automatic analysis methods: There is not only a wealth of standardized argument indicators,
but there are also non-standardized, completely individually formulated ones; or the argument
indicators are missing altogether. In addition, most of the argument indicators do not indicate
the type of argument; the arguing persons themselves are usually too ignorant about
argumentation theory to be able to determine the type consciously. If all the found indicators
are not sufficiently informative, one has to refer back to the definitions of the argument types
themselves and to clues that are based on the original differences (i.e., not on the indicators
that were deliberately added). According to the epistemological approach (which I advocate)
in the theory of argumentation, the different types of arguments are distinguished according
to the epistemological principle on which they are based and on which the structure of the
argument is then also oriented (Lumer, 2005, pp. 222, 231-234; 2011a, pp. 13-26). The
3

This means for example: In the year n three philosophical articles have been published; the
first one does not contain any deductive argument; the second one contains ten deductive
arguments for whose indication three different indicators from the list of Mizrahi and
Dickinson are used, the third one contains 20 deductive argumentations for whose indication
only two different argument indicators are used. Then the year n is listed with (3+2=) five
deductive arguments – instead of (0+10+20=) 30.
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deductive arguments, for example, try to show that the conditions of the deductive
epistemological principle are fulfilled for the respective thesis, namely: 'A proposition p is
true if it is deductively implied by true premises'. If one considers the way of functioning of
deductive inferences, one can, for example, gain from this the indication that certain contentrelated terms that occur in the conclusion must already be found in the premises (Lumer,
2019, p. 771). However, this only applies to ideal deductive arguments. If certain premises
are missing in non-ideal, enthymematic deductive arguments, or if the singular terms for the
same subject or even the predicate expressions for the same predicate vary, then the repetition
of the content-related terms is difficult to recognize and only after additional operations,
especially the premise supplementation and expression standardisation. Now, however, the
adequate premise supplementation in deductive arguments is, as all those who have ever tried
it know, a particularly laborious business. In the case of – not rarely several alternative –
candidates for possibly suitable additions, it must be checked, whether the examined addition
is benevolent, i.e. whether it fulfils the conditions of validity and adequacy for the argument
in question, especially whether it is true and accepted by the arguer. Computer programmes
will continue to have difficulty in answering such questions for a long time to come.
What I want to show with this small excursus is that until there is a halfway reliable
automatic recognition of argument types – not to speak of the automatic evaluation of
argumentations – many problems still have to be solved, which by far exceed the capabilities
of today's machine analysis methods like text recognition. Until then, traditional "manual"
analysis is the only method that is in principle suitable for the reasonably reliable
identification of argument types and for the evaluation of argumentations – also and
especially because it is very cumbersome for complex argumentations.
5. The value of empirical philosophy, especially of the automatic analysis of
philosophical arguments
What has been gained with the insights acquired by Mizrahi and Dickinson? The authors
attribute the relative increase of "inductive" arguments to a "shift in methodology" (M&D 1,
2, 10). At the end they specify this and suggest that it is a shift from an a priori philosophy,
for which deductive arguments stand and which derives necessary truths in the armchair, to
an empirically oriented philosophy, especially experimental philosophy (M&D 11).
This would be an important insight in the history of philosophy. But can this be inferred
from the findings? For one thing, it is still an open question whether not at least a
considerable part of the – all in all not extremely blatant – changes in quantitative relations is
due to a trend away from absolutist to more cautious formulations or to the use of more
standardised argument indicators, especially in the "inductive" arguments (in the course of a
standardisation of writing style, especially in the "inductive camp"). For another thing,
however, if the result is really due to a methodological change, some differentiations are
necessary. 1. The change would not be a change in "philosophy", but perhaps a relative
increase in those philosophers who also use empirical data. 2. Deductive arguments are not
only used in a priori philosophy, but more or less ubiquitously, even in empirical studies.
They even occur within practical arguments. 3. Conversely, the use of probabilistic terms
does not mean that empirical data are involved at all – one can, as I said, use them to express
any kind of uncertainty. 4. Nor does the use of empirical information mean that this use is
part of an empirical philosophy in the usual sense, i.e., which primarily wants to gain
empirical information. Empirical information is also needed in all applied philosophies,
especially in applied ethics and applied epistemology, but often also, for example, in
philosophies that are interested in developing good instruments, from political philosophy to
theory of action (e.g., against weakness of will) to rational decision theory. If the use of
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relatively more "inductive" argument indicators does indeed indicate a methodological
change, then it remains to be seen which one: a change towards methodological naturalism in
general or towards empirical philosophy in particular, towards an increase in applied
philosophies or towards an instrumentally conceived philosophy … 5. In the historical
explanation offered by Mizrahi and Dickinson, another philosophical trend is lost, namely the
strong spread of methodological intuitionism since the 1970s, especially, but by far not only,
in normative and applied ethics. Indeed, this trend is probably largely a change within the
"deductivist camp", since intuitions are often used within deductive arguments; and it can
only be discovered through a content analysis, namely that authors' intuitions are used as
premises. – In short, a more accurate documentation of historical philosophical trends would
have required detailed analyses of the content of philosophical texts.
I was astonished that Mizrahi and Dickinson do not refer at all to a much more
significant result of their study which, if I have interpreted this correctly, can be read from the
enclosed graphs: the strong historical increase in argumentativity of philosophical texts: The
share of the examined philosophical texts with deductive arguments (measured, of course,
according to the method of Mizrahi and Dickinson) increases (according to the graph for up
to ten-word distance between the two partial indicators) from about 2-4% in the period 18901933 to 30.3% in the peak year 2009 and that of the texts with inductive arguments from 12.5% in the period 1890-1933 to 31.8% in the peak year 2009. (M&D 9; my reading from
their figure 3, C.L.) Of course, after the criticism expressed above I would not trust the exact
data at all. But the trend in the indicators is so evident and probably highly significant that it
will also indicate a real trend – probably with a different actual extent. The fact that even
today about 70% of the English philosophical texts do not contain deductive arguments and
also about 70% do not contain inductive ones is probably wrong again and is due to the false
negatives. This proportion should be empirically much smaller, how small, the study does not
really reveal. Well, if the historical increase of deductive arguments is so dramatic, then this
is the main result of the study; and, of course, it would be a very welcome result. If
professional philosophers now additionally argue inductively where deductive arguments
cannot be used any more, then that is even better. The fact that the quantitative primacy is
scarcely reversed from deductive to inductive arguments is then a rather minor, perhaps even
irrelevant result: it is not simply the case that the inductive arguments "suppress" the
deductive ones (as e.g., species of living beings do), but the inductive arguments are
additionally introduced where deductive arguments can no longer be used. The explanation of
the main trend – strengthening of analytical philosophy?, loss of authority of philosophers
and public demands for well-founded results? ... – would again require a content analysis.
How should these trends be evaluated? Mizrahi and Dickinson write several times that
philosophers thought that deductive arguments were the best arguments (M&D 1, 2, 10) And
the authors tend to agree with this (M&D 10). Accordingly, they should actually take a
negative view of the advance of "inductive" arguments; de facto, however, they do not
comment on this. In fact, the assessment of deductive argumentation as the best
argumentation in this generality is wrong. Deductive arguments are the only certain
arguments, and certainty is firstly positive. But deductive arguments have only a small range
because of their epistemic prerequisites; many important theses cannot be justified with them,
e.g. those about the future cannot. If one wants to substantiate such theses, one must resort to
other, weaker arguments. In this respect, the additional growth of "inductive" and abductive
arguments would be prima facie a progress. A problem would be their increase, however, if
this increase were due to the use of methods not suitable for philosophy. And this is
unfortunately true in several cases, for example when one tries to solve philosophical
questions with the help of (empirically surveyed) folk intuition.
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So what has been gained from Mizrahi's and Dickinson's study? For a direct
philosophical-historical use, the empirical results are only relatively weak and very imprecise
indications of the exact actual developments. Of course, they are not of direct normative
significance for philosophical methodology; this would be a clear violation of Hume's law.
My suspicion is: in order to gain important philosophical insights, we need to know the
precise questions of philosophy and the kind of answers that are being sought (cf. Lumer,
2020; 2011b). However, a clear conception of the philosophical questions is missing in a not
inconsiderable part of empirical philosophy. It would therefore be important in general to
concern ourselves more with the metaphilosophical question of what good philosophy is. And
in philosophical argumentation theory we need more research, on this basis, about criteria for
good arguments.
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